This essay attempts to elaborate a first thorough comparative analysis of August Cieszkowski and Nikolaj Berdjaev. Although the latter is well known as one of the most important Russian philosophers, the former is hardly known beyond the Polish borders. This general lack of recognition contrasts with the fact that Cieszkowski played a significant role in nineteenth century philosophy in Germany, France, Poland and Russia. A comparative analysis of Cieszkowski and Berdjaev will undergird the idea that Cieszkowski was not merely a (...) ‘marginal’ figure in the history of philosophy. This essay has sought the reasons why Berdjaev considered himself to a large extent as a disciple of Cieszkowski. The stress is put on the central aspects of both philosophers’ thinking: freedom, praxis and the way they relate to morality in general. (shrink)

Alicja Gescinska verraste met haar kandidatuur op de Europese lijst van de Vlaamse liberalen. Op internet volgde een stortvloed aan reacties: lovende en lasterlijke. Niet enkel de keuze van de partij en het Europese project werden druk besproken, vooral ook wie aan politiek behoort te doen? en wie dus aan de zijlijn moet blijven? bleek stof voor discussie. Wat is de plaats van een filosoof in de samenleving? Zijn politiek en filosofie onverenigbare disciplines? En wat doe je wanneer (...) uit het hart van de Europese politiek het verzoek komt om uit je pen te kruipen? Politiek is meer dan dat wat politici doen. Politiek is alles en iedereen. In het gebrek van de wereld weerklinkt volgens Gescinska een moreel appel dat op ons allen wordt gedaan. 0'Intussen komen mensen om' is een essay over de persoonlijke worsteling met politieke betrokkenheid en intellectuele verantwoordelijkheid. (shrink)

Apart from being a prolific philosopher, Roger Scruton is also an accomplished writer of novels, poems, short stories, libretti and literary memoirs. In this article I will explore how Scruton's literary writings relate to his philosophy. I shall argue that one concept, pivotal to Scruton's philosophy, is also a main Leitmotiv of his literary work: home. The longing to be at home in the world is integral to our human nature. Several phenomena, as Scruton shows in his philosophy and literary (...) works, are indispensable in order for us to be able to fulfil the desire to belong: beauty, oikophilia, and the ability to engage with each other as persons. (shrink)

Klanken uit mijn kindertijd -- Het goede van het schone -- Empathie -- De eenden van Stravinsky -- De grond onder onze voeten -- Slotakkoord.

The volume aims to show the variety of research currents of the Lvov-Warsaw School and the ways in which these currents are developed today. The content of the book is divided into three parts: “Logic and Semiotics”, “Metaphysics and Ontology”, and “Psychology and Sociology”.

The title of this book refers to the tension between formal and informal elements in the ways analytical philosophy is practiced. The authors examine questions of the scopes and limits of both kinds of research methods.

Słownik języka polskiego PWN odnotowuje m.in. trzy znaczenia słowa „fenomen”: (1) rzadkie, niezwykłe zjawisko; (2) osoba wyjątkowa, niezwykle uzdolniona; (3) fakt empiryczny będący punktem wyjścia badań naukowych. W tytule nie chodzi o „fenomen” w sensie drugim, chociaż do Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej należało wiele osób wyjątkowych i niezwykle uzdolnionych, do których z powodzeniem można odnosić słowo „fenomen” w tym sensie. Tytułowy zwrot „Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej” sygnalizuje natomiast, z jednej strony, że książka zdaje sprawę z badań naukowych nad pewnym złożonym „faktem empirycznym” – (...) nad pewną formacją intelektualną wraz z jej dorobkiem. Z drugiej strony tytuł wskazuje na rzadkość i niezwykłość Szkoły: to, że była ona fenomenem nie tylko w dziejach Polski, lecz także w dziejach kultury in toto. Oto kilka faktów, które się na fenomen Szkoły – w tym drugim sensie – składają. Za początek Szkoły przyjmuje się rok 1895, kiedy jej założyciel, Kazimierz Twardowski, przybył z Wiednia do Lwowa i już wkrótce wypromował pierwszych doktorów. Wśród wychowanków (doktorantów) Twardowskiego było ponad dwudziestu przyszłych profesorów tytularnych, którzy w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym zajęli większość katedr filozofii, logiki i psychologii, ale oddziałali także na inne dyscypliny – takie jak literaturoznawstwo, muzykologia, filologia klasyczna etc. Twardowski zmarł w 1938 roku, a za koniec Szkoły niektórzy przyjmują rok 1939 – istotnie II wojna światowa spowodowała spustoszenie w szeregach przedstawicieli Szkoły, a jeszcze silniejszy cios stanowił dla niej okres stalinizmu. Jednakże Kilka wybitnych postaci Szkoły – takich jak Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stefan Swieżawski czy Władysław Tatarkiewicz – działało jeszcze wiele lat po wojnie, wychowując kolejne pokolenia w duchu właściwego Szkole antyirracjonalizmu. Wielu spośród autorów tekstów do niniejszego tomu to przedstawiciele młodszych pokoleń Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej sensu largo. Spoiwem Szkoły był nie pewien zespół idei, który wyznawaliby jej członkowie, lecz pewne postulaty metodologiczne oraz pewien zestaw wartości, które były w Szkole akceptowane przez kolejne pokolenia. O tych postulatach metodologicznych i o tym zestawie wartości mówią szczegółowo autorzy tekstów tu zamieszczonych. Ogromnemu wpływowi Szkoły na kulturę polską towarzyszyła recepcja wyników osiąganych przez jej członków za granicą. Naszym „towarem eksportowym” była szeroko rozumiana logika (logiki wielowartościowe i metalogika Łukasiewicza, gramatyka kategorialna Ajdukiewicza, koncepcja prawdy Tarskiego). Wiele osiągnięć członków Szkoły w innych dziedzinach zagranica odkrywa dla siebie dopiero dziś i wyniki te budzą podziw u tych, którzy się z nimi stykają. Ideą stojącą za powstaniem „Fenomenu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej” była chęć ukazania Szkoły w jak najszerszej perspektywie, także przez pryzmat mniej znanych, choć ważnych postaci i osiągnięć. Ze wstępu Książkę można zamówić tutaj: https://ksiegarnia.academicon.pl/glowna/187-fenomen-szkoly-lwowsko-warszawskiej-miekka-oprawa--97883 62475193.html. (shrink)

The main aim of this study was to examine whether the economic status determined pro-ecological attitudes and behaviour. The survey involved 207 adults with different economic status. Both economic status in childhood and the present were taken into consideration. Analysis of the results indicated that people raised in families with low and medium material status have not only more eco-friendly attitudes but also have a greater tendency towards various ‘green’ behaviours. The differences among people with different current material status concerning (...) their eco-friendly attitudes and behaviours are not so obvious. The most wealthy seem to have a less pro-ecological attitude, but on the other hand they are ready to put more money towards ecologically-friendly household expenses. (shrink)

The subject of my analyses is the concept of melancholy developed by Alicja Kuczyńska. I am interested in the connection between the creative aspect of melancholy—understood as a certain kind of philosophical attitude—and the concept of a whole. Taking a whole to be an “ideal model in the evaluation of the world and of things” gives us an insight into the meaning of being provided by the philosophical attitude of melancholy. Kuczyńska believes the application of this model is connected (...) both with the possibility of harmonising the parts of this whole and with the search for what varies within the same whole. As a result, melancholy comes to the fore as a state of suspension between repetition and originality—an essential requirement for creativity. (shrink)

I respond to the five papers of criticism in this issue of Philosophy. I argue that my cognitive dualism, which may be open to the theological objections levelled by Fiona Ellis, is vindicated by its ability to explain both freedom and inter-personal relations. I defend the inter-subjectivity of aesthetic judgment against Simon Blackburn's argument from ‘the acquaintance principle’, and my vision of cultural decline against the sceptical arguments of Samuel Hughes. The crucial role played by subjectivity in my fiction, discussed (...) by Alicja Gescinska, enables me to add to David McPherson's account of existential conservatism, with which I largely concur. I end on a note of puzzlement, as to why such innocent arguments should be the target of such implacable hatred. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several (...) ways, but none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims. Using the example of the science of well-being, I articulate a conception of objectivity for this science and for mixed claims in general. _1_ Introduction _2_ What Are Mixed Claims? _3_ Mixed Claims Are Different _3.1_ Values as reasons to pursue science _3.2_ Values as agenda-setters _3.3_ Values as ethical constraints on research protocols _3.4_ Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories _3.5_ Values as determinants of standards of confirmation _3.6_ Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud _4_ Mixed Claims Should Stay _4.1_ Against Nagel _5_ The Dangers of Mixed Claims _6_ The Existing Accounts of Objectivity _6.1_ The perils of impartiality _7_ Objectivity for Mixed Claims _8_ Three Rules _8.1_ Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures _8.2_ Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements _8.3_ Consult the relevant parties _9_ Conclusion. (shrink)

The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on the issue (...) of progress in economics. In particular, it enables us to get clear on exactly what has been progressing, and on exactly what theory has – and has not – contributed to that. This in turn has important implications for just what it is about economic theory that we should value. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...) in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of co-action, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ's components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as parts, not persons. (shrink)

Many political theorists today deny that citizenship can be defended on liberal grounds alone. Cosmopolitans claim that loyalty to a particular state is incompatible with universal liberal principles, which hold that we have equal duties of justice to persons everywhere, while nationalist theorists justify civic obligations only by reaching beyond liberal principles and invoking the importance of national culture. In Liberal Loyalty, Anna Stilz challenges both views by defending a distinctively liberal understanding of citizenship. Drawing on Kant, Rousseau, and (...) Habermas, Stilz argues that we owe civic obligations to the state if it is sufficiently just, and that constitutionally enshrined principles of justice in themselves--rather than territory, common language, or shared culture--are grounds for obedience to our particular state and for democratic solidarity with our fellow citizens. She demonstrates that specifying what freedom and equality mean among a particular people requires their democratic participation together as a group. Justice, therefore, depends on the authority of the democratic state because there is no way equal freedom can be defined or guaranteed without it. Yet, as Stilz shows, this does not mean that each of us should entertain some vague loyalty to democracy in general. Citizens are politically obligated to their own state and to each other, because within their particular democracy they define and ultimately guarantee their own civil rights. Liberal Loyalty is a persuasive defense of citizenship on purely liberal grounds. (shrink)

This article is a mutual introduction of the science of well-being to philosophy of science and an explanation of how the two disciplines can benefit each other. In the process, I argue that the science of well-being is not helpfully viewed as a social or a natural, but rather as a mixed, science. Hence, its methodology will have to attend to its specific features. I discuss two of its methodological problems: justifying the role of values, and validating measures. I suggest (...) that tackling them calls for developing mid-level rather than high theories of well-being. (shrink)

This book defends an account of justice to nonhuman beings – i.e., to animals, plants etc. – also known as ecological or interspecies justice, and which lies in the intersection of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, against the background of the current extinction crisis this book defends a global non-ranking biocentric theory of distributive ecological/interspecies justice to wild nonhuman beings, because the extinction crisis does not only need practical solutions, but also an account of how it is (...) the outcome of large-scale injustice. This book not only provides a novel theoretical framework that supports such a claim, but it also develops the theoretical tools to find just compromises between the entitlements of intraspecies and intra-human global distributive justice to ecological space for the purpose of working towards a vision of just conservation. -/- Content: 1. Introducing Ecological Justice 2. Political Non-Ranking Biocentrism 3. The Community of Justice 4. The Currency of Distributive Justice 5. The Principles of Distributive Justice 6. Ecological Justice and the Capabilities Approach 7. Biodiversity Loss: An Injustice? 8. Who Owns the Earth? 9. Visions of Just Conservation 10. Outlook for Implementation . (shrink)

Kant's radical criticism of the passions has a central but largely overlooked moral-psychological component: for Kant, the passions promote a kind of self-deception he calls ‘rationalizing’. In analysing the connection between passion and rationalizing self-deception, I identify and reconstruct two essential traits of Kant's conception of the passions. I argue (1) that rationalizing self-deception, according to Kant, contributes massively to the emergence and consolidation of passions. It aims to resolve a psychological conflict between passion and moral duty when in fact, (...) it does not resolve but perpetuates this conflict. I then argue (2) that rationalizing does not necessarily aim to devalue moral duty, as Kant seems to suggest in the Groundwork. It can also aim to revalue the ‘counterweight’. By analysing Kant's presentation of several individual passions in the Anthropology, I demonstrate that rationalizing here is concerned with elevating these passions and making them pass as morally (or at least prudentially) justified. (shrink)

Anna Alexandrova on value judgements and the measurement of well-being.

Building on the author's earlier work, this paper argues that language is a key issue in understanding human emotions and that treating English emotion terms as valid analytical tools continues to be a roadblock in the study of emotions. Further, it shows how the methodology developed by the author and colleagues, known as NSM (from Natural Semantic Metalanguage), allows us to break free of the “shackles” (Barrett, 2006) of English psychological terms and explore human emotions from a culture-independent perspective. The (...) use of NSM makes it possible to study human emotions from a genuinely cross-linguistic and cross-cultural, as well as a psychological, perspective and thus “opens up new possibilities for the scientific understanding of subjectivity and psychological experience” (Goddard, 2007). (shrink)

We can understand implicit bias as a person’s disposition to evaluate members of a social group in a less favorable light than members of another social group, without intending to do so. If we understand it this way, we should not presuppose a one-size-fits-all answer to the question of how implicit cognitive states lead to skewed evaluations of other people. The focus of this paper is on implicit bias in considered decisions. It is argued that we have good reasons to (...) assume that imagination plays a vital role in decision making. If this assumption is correct, it offers an explanation for implicit bias in many considered decisions: Human beings who have been frequently exposed to stereotypes have stereotype-congruent expectations as part of their background knowledge. They feed into their imagination, sometimes without their awareness. This model would allow us to explain the key characteristics of implicit bias without recurring to any unconscious attitudes over and above such background knowledge. (shrink)

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and (...) the wider scope of intellectual history. (shrink)

Different arguments in favor of the moral relevance of the concept of biodiversity (e.g., in terms of its intrinsic or instrumental value) face a range of serious difficulties, despite that biodiversity constitutes a central tenet of many environmentalist practices and beliefs. That discrepancy is considerable for the debate on potential moral reasons for protecting biodiversity. This paper adds a new angle by focusing on the potential of the concept of natural otherness—specifically individual and process otherness in nature—for providing additional moral (...) reasons in favor of the protection of biodiversity as variety. Four arguments are presented. Two arguments draw on the individual natural otherness of nonhuman living beings and two additional arguments draw on the process otherness of active nature. The upshot is that each of these arguments—if successful—provides a moral reason in favor of the protection of biodiversity. (shrink)

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different (...) problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed. (shrink)

Semantics of natural language; includes some Australian language examples.

Unlike the question of whether self-deception can be understood on the model of other-deception, the relationship between the two phenomena at the level of practice is hardly ever explored. Other-deception can support self-deception and vice versa. Self-deception often affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person but also the beliefs and behavior of others who may become accomplices of self-deception. As I will show, however, it is difficult to describe this supportive relationship between self-deception and the deception (...) of others without conceptual contradiction. While “deflationary” approaches offer a convincing way to avoid the so-called paradoxes of self-deception, they do not resolve the conceptual tensions that arise here. I conclude by outlining a solution. (shrink)

The author argues that the so-called “basic emotions”, such as happiness, fear or anger, are in fact cultural artifacts of the English language, just as the Ilongot concept of liget, or the Ifaluk concept of song, are the cultural artifacts of Ilongot and Ifaluk. It is therefore as inappropriate to talk about human emotions in general in terms of happiness, fear, or anger as it would be to talk about them in terms of liget or song. However, this does not (...) mean that we cannot penetrate into the emotional world of speakers of languages other than our own. Nor does it mean that there cannot be any universal human emotions. Universality of emotions is an open issue which requires further investigation. For this further investigation to be fully productive, it has to be undertaken from a universal, language and culture-independent perspective; and it has to be carried out in a universalist framework that is language and culture-independent. The author proposes for this purpose the “natural semantic metalanguage” based on universal (or near-universal) semantic primitives (or near-primitives), developed over two decades by herself and colleagues, and she argues that the use of this metalanguage facilitates such a perspective and offers such a framework. (shrink)

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (...) (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”. (shrink)

Biological conservation practices and approaches take many forms. Conservation projects do not only differ in their aims and methods, but also concerning their conceptual and normative background assumptions and their underlying motivations and objectives. We draw on philosophical distinctions from the ethics of conservation to explain variances of different positions on conservation projects along six dimensions: (1) conservation ideals, (2) intervention intuitions, (3) the moral considerability of nonhuman beings, (4) environmental values, (5) views on nature and (6) human roles in (...) nature. The result is a map of the moral landscape of biological conservation, on which these six dimensions are layered. This map functions as a heuristic tool to understand conceptual and normative foundations of specific conservation projects, which we will illustrate with four paradigmatic examples: the Pisavaara Strict Nature Reserve, Predator Free New Zealand, the Oostvaardersplassen Nature Reserve and the Great Green Wall Project. With this map as a heuristic tool, we aim to conceptually illuminate disagreement and clarify misunderstandings between representatives of different environmental protection strategies and to show that the same project can be supported (or criticised) on different grounds. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)

Empirical evidence indicates that women philosophers tend to submit their work to journals substantially less often than their male colleagues. This paper points out that this difference in submission behavior comes with other specific aspects of women philosophers’ behavior, such as a tendency to be reluctant to participate in discussions, to be willing to do work low in prestige, and to specialize in certain research topics, and it argues that these differences can be understood as indirect effects of social biases: (...) namely, effects on the working behavior of members of targeted social groups. Recent findings from philosophy journals’ book review sections and from other academic disciplines known to suffer from gender problems, especially from STEM disciplines, lend additional weight to this hypothesis. (shrink)

There are two main ways of understanding the function of surrogate decision making in a legal context: the Best Interests Standard and the Substituted Judgment Standard. First, we will argue that the Best Interests Standard is difficult to apply to unconscious patients. Application is difficult regardless of whether they have ever been conscious. Second, we will argue that if we accept the least problematic explanation of how unconscious patients can have interests, we are also obliged to accept that the Substituted (...) Judgment Standard can be coherently applied to patients who have never been conscious at the same extent as the Best Interests Standard. We then argue that acknowledging this result is important in order to show patients respect. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe paper argues for the restricted viability of the concept of style in the history of science. Since historians of science borrow this term from art history or the sociology of knowledge, the paper outlines its emergence and function in these disciplines, in order to show that the need for ever subtler stylistic distinctions in historical description inevitably leads to the dissolution of the concept of style itself.“Style” will be defined in predominantly cognitive or technical terms when imputed to (...) an individual; in social or moral terms when thought to be carried by some collective entity. Both descriptions are given normative interpretations. A good individual style, then, is regarded as the pledge for valid knowledge or insights of a “higher order,” while a collective style, understood as the vehicle of successful intra group communication, involves the acceptance of certain rhetorical norms and/or socially shared values that are supposed to structure that style. “National styles” belong to the latter category; the emergence of this dubious notion can best be explained in sociological terms.If historians of science insist on adopting the concept of style, they will have to agree on its meaning. The paper concludes, therefore, with a rough typology of its most frequent meanings and uses. (shrink)

Addresses the place of addiction in modern art, literature, philosophy, and psychology, including its effects on the works of such thinkers and writers as Heidegger, Nietzsche, DeQuincey, Breton, and Burroughs.

ABSTRACT This paper adds to efforts to retrieve the long-neglected philosophical contributions of Karoline von Günderrode, and is one of the first to seriously address the political commitments in Günderrode’s work, especially regarding revolution. This idea gains an unusual status in the context of Günderrode’s metaphysics, and is key to understanding the connections between Günderrode’s more obviously philosophical writings and her literary work. I argue that Günderrode’s concept of revolution resembles, in some respects, the ideas of other thinkers of her (...) time, but has ramifications for conceiving of human individuals and their relationships to society and nature that are unique to Günderrode. First, I use a comparison with the work of contemporaries on revolution to justify interpreting Günderrode’s metaphysics in relation to her thought on politics. Günderrode often masks her political thought in the form of plays, and the paper next considers the theme of revolution in her plays Muhammad, the Prophet of Mecca, and Udohla. Lastly, the paper contrasts Günderrode’s position on revolution to claims by Herder and Fichte, arguing that Günderrode’s conception of a cycle of enhancement and decay of natural forces, political power and social cohesion differs from androcentric models that emphasize the development of consciousness. (shrink)

Research involving children or other incompetent subjects who are deemed unable to provide informed consent is complex, particularly in the case of research that does not directly benefit the research subjects themselves. The Helsinki Declaration, the World Medical Association's landmark document for research ethics, therefore states that incompetent research subjects must not be included in such research unless it entails only minimal risk and minimal burden. In this paper, we argue that now that research in these groups is expected to (...) expand, this undifferentiated minimal risk and burden requirement does not suffice any more. In the upcoming revision of the Declaration, the paragraph at stake should be refined in such a way that it is not unnecessarily restrictive or more permissive than can be ethically justified. Our first recommendation is to stimulate research ethics committees to identify more accurately those risks and burdens that the research subjects must undergo solely for research purposes by distinguishing between two types of study procedures instead of between two types of studies. Our second recommendation is to allow for exceptions to the minimal risk and burden requirement in cases of exceptionally valuable studies that involve subjects who can give their assent to participate in the study and that involve at most a minor increase over minimal risk and/or burden. (shrink)